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ABSTRACT 
Online service providers offer “free” services in exchange for the personal data of its users. In the last 
few years there has been an increase of online industry regulations requiring service providers, such as 
websites and app developers, to disclosure the ways in which they collect, process and use the personal 
data of service users. These “privacy disclosures,” such as the privacy policy, the cookie notice and, on 
smart phones, the app permission request, are designed with the purpose of informing users and 
empowering them to control their privacy. The interaction problems with these different types of 
disclosure are relatively well understood – habituation, inattention and cognitive biases undermine the 
extent to which user consent is truly informed. Users understanding of the actual content of these 
disclosures, and their feelings toward it, are less well understood, though. In this paper we report  the 
results of a mixed-method exploratory study of the privacy disclosures and compare their relative merits 
as a starting point for the development of more meaningful consent interactions. First, we conducted a 
focus group study, with 21 students from the University of Southampton, to understand behavior and 
privacy concerns of Millenials (those born between 1982 and 2004) in response to the these three most 
common types of privacy disclosure. Second, we conducted an online survey, with 100 students from the 
University of Southampton, to study perception and feelings towards the content of the privacy 
disclosures. We identify three key findings. Firstly, we find heterogeneity of user perceptions and 
attitudes to privacy disclosures in both studies. The results of the focus groups suggests three types of 
users: the scared  and worried about their online privacy, who think there is an option out; the naïve, who 
do not understand how their personal data is collected and processed by the online service providers; and 
the meh, who understand the tradeoff but are not worried about their privacy. Secondly, we find limited 
ability of users to infer data processing outputs and risks based on technical explanations of particular 
practices, suggestions of a naïve model of “cost justification” rather cost-benefit analysis by users. 
Finally, we show evidence of the possibility that consent interactions are valuable in themselves as a 
mean to improve user perceptions of a service. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
The extent to which users are in control of their personal data is a hot topic among policy 
makers, legislators, researchers and users themselves.  In the European Union, the United 
States of America and beyond, organizations commonly explain their data processing practices 
to consumers via detailed privacy policies.  Furthermore, legislation on both sides of the 
Atlantic requires user consent to specific data uses either in specific scenarios (such as 
granting permission to be sent marketing emails) or as a general data protection principle. 
The extent to which users' consent can be said to be informed, or meaningful, is intuitively 
dependent on the quality of the content of these “privacy disclosures” in terms of how well 
they help users to understand the processing that their personal data will be subject to, how 
they can control that processing and how the processing might impact them. 
In this paper we present the results of a mixed-methods exploratory study into the 
understanding, behavior and privacy concerns of Millenials (those born between 1982 and 
2004 (Howe & Strauss, 2000)) in response to three common types of privacy disclosure: 1) 
The privacy policy, itself; 2) Cookie Notices: small notices that are displayed on websites; and 
3) App Permission Requests.  
We use the qualitative and quantitative insights from these investigations to compare these 
three types of privacy disclosure and to suggest how future disclosures might be designed. 
First we report the results of four focus groups, showing the heterogeneity of preferences and 
concerns toward privacy disclosures. We also show that participants typically view these 
disclosures negatively unless they are able to understand why a particular type of processing is 
taking place, and also that they consider other aspects beyond this, such as whether they are 
being treated fairly in the way that the choice is presented to them. Second, we report the 
results of two online surveys.  
We show that in both surveys, the first about privacy policies and app permission requests 
and the second about cookie notices, there is significant heterogeneity in users’ perceptions 
and feelings towards statements made by service providers and manufacturers regarding the 
use of, or access to, personal data. In the first survey we show that users consider that some 
privacy policies reflect a positive attitude of the service provider towards their users (such as 
those referencing the protection of privacy), others a negative attitude (such as those 
informing users about how their personal data could be shared), while others perceived as 
more neutral (often those referring to technical details). We also show that most users perceive 
app permission negatively and are willing to pay a small amount to protect their privacy. This 
result seems to be driven primarily by skepticism over the legitimacy of many permission 
requests given the purpose for which the user installed the app. In the second survey, we show 
that cookie notices that refer to users’ privacy and provide more detailed explanation are 
perceived more positively than those that merely state the presence and use of cookies. 
The contribution of this work is to better understand the process by which users make 
sense of the privacy information with which they are provided.  Existing literature, (egKelley 
et al., 2009), confirms the lived experience of most web users, ie that users do not read privacy 
policies. However, conveying information to users – in some form – must, by definition, form 
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part of any future consent mechanisms and so understanding how such information is 
understood by users provides, as we shall discuss later, important insights into the 
development of more meaningful consent interactions in the future. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we start with a discussion 
of relevant issues in meaningful consent and give a brief description of the three types of 
privacy disclosure that are considered in this work. In section 3 we present the study 
methodology and procedures. Section 4 presents the results of the exploratory investigation. 
Finally, we summarize our findings and conclude in Section 5.   
2. BACKGROUND 
Regulators and policy makers, at least within Europe, are increasingly using user consent as a 
mean of empowering data subjects to control the processing of their personal data.  This is 
evident in the 2009 ePrivacy directive (Anon, 2009) as well as the upcoming General Data 
Protection Regulations (GDPR).  However, as anyone who has read a privacy policy or 
experienced one of the UK's “cookie notices” can vouch, the consent mechanisms that arise 
from these regulations have not, to date, led to the routine collection of what we might 
consider “meaningful” consent from data subjects and seem, for the most part, more 
concerned with the creation of a legal fiction rather than genuine empowerment of data 
subjects. 
2.1 Consent 
Existing work on consent typically considers the requirements for “informed” consent, and 
although we purposely use the term meaningful to distance ourselves from existing legal 
assumptions about consent, work on informed consent is a principle that influences our work. 
Informed consent involves two broad components: information (in which a person is 
provided with information) and assent (in which they signal that they agree to the request that 
is being made). In offline media this process could take the form of reading and signing a 
physical form, and on a conventional computing device it often involves reading a notice and 
clicking a button. 
Friedman et al. (2002)formulate informed consent as consisting of six key components: 
Disclosure (providing adequate information), Comprehension (the individual having sufficient 
understanding of the provided information), Voluntariness (the ability for the individual to 
reasonably resist participation), Competence (the individual possessing the requisite mental, 
emotional and physical capabilities), Agreement (a reasonably clear opportunity to accept or 
decline participation) and Minimal Distraction (the consent process itself not being so 
overwhelming as to cause the individual to disengage from the process). Of these six, 
Disclosure, Comprehension and Competence are the most highly dependent on the content 
that is provided to the user, while voluntariness, agreement and minimal distraction are largely 
properties of the broader design and choice context. 
In this work we focus primarily on the content of the privacy disclosures and how users 
comprehend this information.   However, numerous behavioral biases and cognitive shortcuts, 
such as decision fatigue, habituation or aversion to irrelevant or incomprehensible legal 
information (Kahneman & Tversky, 1984; Böhme & Köpsell, 2010), make meaningful and 
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informed consent problematic for human beings.  While the content of a disclosure is a 
necessary component of meaningful consent, we do not claim that it is sufficient in itself, and 
issues such as presentation and interaction still need to be considered from a behavioral point 
of view. 
2.2 Cookies and the ePrivacy Directive 
Cookie notices are commonly displayed in some European Union member states, as a result of 
the EU's revised ePrivacy directive. They are designed to fulfill the directive’s requirement 
that service providers obtain user consent before data is stored on, or retrieved from, a user's 
computing device. 
Browser cookies are a technical mechanism for maintaining state between HTTP requests.  
Although they support numerous online interactions – including, for instance, the ubiquitous 
“shopping basket” – their use has evolved to support data sharing both within and across sites.  
So-called “third parties”, such as advertising or analytics companies, may use a single 
persistent cookie to track users as they browse through affiliated websites (Mayer & Mitchell, 
2012) for the purposes of understanding user interests, demographics or other profile 
information, often forming highly interconnected and pervasive networks (Gomer et al., 
2013). It is as a result of concerns about the use of cookies for purposes such as third party 
tracking, and the impact that this has on citizens' privacy, that the European Union introduced 
the consent requirement into the 2009 revisions of the e-Privacy Directive (Anon, 2009). 
In February 2015, a joint survey of popular websites by the European data protection 
regulators (ARTICLE 29 DATA PROTECTION WORKING PARTY 2015) found that many 
operators now provide some disclosure of cookie use, but that only 16% of sites provided 
granular controls over which cookies are used. 
2.3 Privacy Policies 
Privacy policies are a legal requirement in many jurisdictions. They are typically required to 
contain information about the types of data that an organization collects and the ways that it 
may be processed (eg.Kelley et al., 2012). 
There are difficulties in creating privacy policies that are concise enough for users to read 
but which convey all the information that is required for users to make informed decisions.  
Previous research has aimed to make privacy policies more readable (Mcdonald et al., 2009; 
Kelley et al., 2009) or standardized (Cradock et al., 2015). Other research shows that, when 
users feel that they have understood a privacy policy, they are more likely to trust the web site 
to which it applies (Ermakova et al., 2014). 
In this paper we study how users feel when the privacy policies of online service providers, 
such as Facebook and Google, are highlighted and what their understanding is of those privacy 
policies.  
2.4 App Permissions 
The use of ‘apps’ on smart devices such as mobile phones or tablets potentially creates privacy 
concerns for users. These apps may access, process and transmit personal data that is stored on 
the device (such as photos or contact information) or which is available through the various 
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sensors embedded into the devices (for instance location, or even, in the case of some devices, 
physiological data such as heart rate). 
On the Android platform (and others) the user is informed and must explicitly opt to 
continue installation of an app if it requires access to personal data, such as their address book 
or location.In Android M, this process is made more granular and the user must make a 
decision about each permission, the first time that a permission is required by the app. 
Previous research has shown that app users are often unaware of the extent to which apps 
can access personal data(Kelley et al. 2012; Liccardi et al. 2014)and the potential privacy and 
security issues that this access can cause. 
Despite the presence of this supposedly informing feature, many users still find app 
behavior 'creepy' (Shklovski et al. 2014) which suggests that it is not succeeding in fully 
reassuring or empowering app users. 
3. STUDY METHODOLOGY 
3.1 Focus Group 
The first part of our study took the form of focus groups in which we led a discussion among 
four groups of “millennial” students – a mix of undergraduates and postgraduates - about their 
perceptions, understanding, and concerns relating to the three types of privacy disclosure: 
privacy policies, cookie notices, and app permission requests. Each of the four groups had 
between 4 and 5 members and lasted for about one hour. In total 21 students participated in the 
study. 
The aim of these groups was to glean a qualitative understanding of the factors that seem 
to influence the participants' understandings and opinions of the different disclosures. 
Moreover, we aimed to understand what type of privacy policies, cookies notices and app 
permission requests users considered to reflect a positive, negative or neutral attitude of the 
online service provider or app developer towards their users. This was crucial to the choice of 
the privacy disclosures in the second study, the online survey.  
Participants for the focus groups were recruited primarily from interns and postgraduates at 
the University of Southampton by means of mailing lists and personal invitation, although 
some participants were drawn from other departments. Participants were provided with an 
information sheet about the purpose of the study and what to expect during the session. 
Participants were seated around a table with two of the investigators. The sessions were 
structured through the use of a set of slides that were projected on to a screen. The slides had 
four sections: 
1: A series of statements taken from online privacy policies. We asked participants if they 
thought the statements showed a positive, negative or neutral attitude of the service provider 
towards their users, and to explain why. 
2: Screenshots of some cookie consent notices from UK websites.  We asked participants 
to explain the reasons that they thought the website was displaying the notice, what the notice 
meant, what the website would do and what they thought other parts of the notice (including 
phrases such as “improve your experience”) might mean. 
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3: A series of statements taken from the Android app permission descriptions, such as 
“This app would like permission to... access your contacts”. We asked them to explain what 
they thought each permission meant, and their feelings towards apps that request it. 
4: Two exercises in which participants were asked to imagine what information a) 
Facebook and b) a behavioral advertising company, like DoubleClick, might know about 
them. 
At the end of the focus group participants were asked to rate 25 statements taken from 
Facebook and Google’s privacy policies. In the two first focus groups participants completed 
this task on paper at the end of the session, in the other two groups participants were directed 
to fill it out online.  
3.2 Online Survey 
The second part of the study took the form of an online survey. 99 “millennial” participants 
were recruited primarily from the University of Southampton via student groups on Facebook.  
66 participants were first shown 14 statements taken from Facebook and Google’s privacy 
policies, and 10 app permissions taken from Android smart phones. They were asked to 
indicate whether they felt each one showed a positive, negative or neutral attitude of the 
service or app developer towards their users(see table 1 and table 2in appendix A).At the end 
of the survey they were presented with a hypothetical scenario in which they were asked to 
imagine that they were purchasing a new app. They were then asked to reveal how much they 
would be willing to pay (from £0 to £5) to use the app without giving it permission to access 
the data stored in their phone. 
“You are about to purchase a single-player game for your mobile phone in the app 
store. There are many versions of this game available depending on the permissions 
you give to the app, such as its ability to see your location or to read your texts. You 
are able to turn off all the permissions and the game will still function. However, this 
will cost you £5. If you give all the permissions it asks for, the game is for free. You 
can choose which permissions you do not want your app to have. 
Please specify how much you are willing to pay to deny the following 
permissions to the app, on a scale from £0 to £5:” (see table 3 in Appendix A for a 
description of all the permission requests).  
The 14 privacy policy statements were selected from a larger initial set of 25, based on 
ratings provided by participants from the focus groups. Our inclusion criterion was that the 
statements had been rated as positive or negative by more than 55% of the initial focus group 
participants and neutral by more than 45% of those groups (as none reached the 55% level of 
consensus for neutrality).The app permission requests were selected from the most widely 
used apps (worldwide) in the Google Play store, such as Facebook, WhatsApp and a selection 
of games. 
We conducted a second survey in which 33 participants were shown seven cookies notices 
and asked to rank whether they felt each one was positive, negative or neutral (see table 4 in 
appendix A). We also asked participants to rate, overall, whether they felt the presence of 
cookie notices on websites was in itself positive, negative or neutral and whether they recalled 
seeing such notices previously. 
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4. RESULTS 
4.1 Focus Groups 
In the focus group study we found that the majority of students were familiar with cookie 
notices, privacy policies and app permissions.  However, we also found a significant degree of 
misunderstanding about what the content of each disclosure meant and a very mixed set of 
concerns relating to specific pieces of content found in each. Results are discussed for each 
type of disclosure, along with general findings that are common to all. 
4.2 Cookie Notices 
Almost all of the participants recalled seeing cookie notices, although many were quick to add 
that they rarely read them and usually just clicked agree or ignored them.  When asked what 
they thought the notices meant, participants were often unable to suggest how cookies could 
fulfill a purpose such as “make this website better” or “improve your experience”.  Typically, 
though, they interpreted this as personalization.  A few expressed that the intent was to collect 
analytics through which the website could be improved in general rather than made to work 
better specifically for them, but those participants were in a minority. 
A few participants explained that cookies could be used to access browsing history, others 
thought that cookies stored information about demographics, but were unsure how this 
information was obtained. 
Some participants felt it was unfair to declare the use of cookies but provide no means to 
opt-out. In the words of one participant, it is “undemocratic” to provide no means to use a 
website without being able to reject the cookies.  This sentiment does not necessarily seem to 
be driven by a particular concern over the use of cookies in general, rather a response to the 
lack of choice in itself. 
Many participants were reassured by the statement that the cookies would not interfere 
with their privacy, but some were critical of this statement.  They expressed doubt that 
remembering things about their visit could be done in a way that did not interfere with their 
privacy and commented on the subjective nature of what constitutes privacy.The vast majority 
of participants did not realise that Facebook also has access to partial browsing history gleaned 
through their “share” and “like” widgets. 
4.3 Privacy Statements 
Participants were mixed in their responses to the individual privacy statements.  Statements 
that referred to “protecting” privacy or to not sharing data were perceived positively.  
They were generally negative towards the idea of Google or Facebook sharing data with 
third-parties, nevertheless, most participants suggested that they trusted that those companies 
would not do anything to harm them.  
Many participants mentioned the perceived lack of choice and a contagion effect – for 
instance commenting “there is no option if I want to use Facebook or Google, as everybody is 
using it”.Given the wide range of services provided by Facebook and Google and their many 
subsidiary companies and partners, participants were unsure what the “family of companies” 
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that constitute Facebook contained and so did not understand which companies their data 
might be shared with. One participant interpreted this statement very broadly, as including all 
companies with a Facebook page. 
There was also a negative consensus about the idea of processing their personal data in 
foreign countries.  This was seen as unnecessary and potentially risky, some participants 
commented that they might have less legal protection if their data was transferred abroad. 
When we asked participants to comment on purely technical statements, such as 
explanations of cookies and pixels, they were generally less negative but felt that the purpose 
of their use was important.   
4.3.1 App Permissions 
Apps that ask for permission to access features or data on smart phones were perceived 
negatively, but this seems to be contextual.  Participants said they viewed permission requests 
more positively when they understand why the permission has been requested and perceive 
that behavior as a legitimate function of the app. Some participants expressed resentment at 
the lack of choice they have, such as the inability to reject individual permissions. 
Participants had differing interpretations of what the permissions meant in practice.  For 
instance, the “full network access” permission was viewed negatively because participants felt 
this implied that the app would be “browsing the web” in the background. 
4.3.2 General Findings 
In all three scenarios – privacy policies, cookie notices and app permissions – participants 
seemed to take into account the purpose of the request when articulating their assessment. 
Cookies that ostensibly “improve” experience are seen more positively.  Apps that request 
permissions were seen generally negatively, except when participants felt that the permission 
was justified given the purpose of the app.  Privacy policy statements that refer to data or/and 
privacy protection were received more positively than those that indicate that their personal 
data would be shared with third parties or processed in other countries different from the one 
they lived on.  
Cultural context, or specific privacy concerns, seems to be taken into account by 
participants.  This was particularly common among our foreign participants who often related 
it to the cultural context of their home countries. For instance, a Turkish participant spoke of 
how they felt they had less freedom to criticize the government; a Mexican participant linked 
posting photos of his dog to the risk of it being stolen for ransom and another participant 
spoke of the different risks that male and female internet users might face because of the 
cultural expectations around gender in his home country. 
At the end of the focus groups, and following a debrief session during which we answered 
any questions that participants had about the issues we had touched on, most of the 
participants admitted to feeling more concerned about their privacy than before taking part in 
the focus group. This sentiment was not universal, though. Some of the participants expressed 
that they had learned new things about the mechanisms or extent of, for instance, third party 
tracking, but still did not feel it was a problem to them personally. 
This focus group study had 3 main outcomes. First it helped us to map the heterogeneity of 
the “millennial” generations. Broadly, we found that most participants could be categorized as 
one of three stereotypes: The “Meh”, those who reveal that they don’t care about their privacy 
or how the online services providers are using theirs and others personal data; the “Scared,” 
who realize the risks of sharing personal information, but felt they don’t have an option out; 
IADIS International Journal on WWW/Internet 
9 
and the “Naïve,” who don’t have a clue of what is happening online, just want to use the 
services and trust that the companies will not do anything to harm them or sell their personal 
data. Second, it allowed us to observe the reactions of participants as they became more aware 
of data collections and processing practices and (in many cases) decided to be more protective 
of their data.At the end of the focus groups, and following a debrief session, most of the 
participants admitted to feeling more concerned about their privacy than before taking part in 
the focus group. Finally, it helped us to choose the privacy policy statements, app permission 
requests and cookie notices to be used in the online surveys.  
4.4 Online survey study 
4.4.1 Privacy Policies 
 
Figure 1. Privacy policy ratings 
Figure 1 shows the percentage of participants that ranked each of the privacy policy statements 
as positive, neutral or negative (see table 1 in appendix A for a description of all the privacy 
policies’ statements). We observe a large degree of heterogeneity in how participants 
perceived the privacy policy statements. However, there are some trends in how different 
types of statement were rated. For example, statements like PS1, PS12 and PS13 refer to data 
protection, privacy concerns and trust, and the general population of this study considers those 
to be positive. On the other hand statements that suggest data is going to be collected and 
shared, for example PS2, PS10 and PS14, are considered to be negative. Statements about 
cookies – such as their definition and usage - are normally considered to be neutral; for 
instance PS3, PS4 and PS9. 
These results are consistent with those found in the focus groups and indicate that when 
users do read the privacy policies, they do understand them to some extent, considering 
positively those that refer to the protection of their data and to personalization and negatively 
those that indicate data collection and sharing.  
4.4.2 App Permission Requests 
Figure 2 shows how participants perceive app permission requests. We can observe that a 
majority of those permissions requests were considered negative in a 7-scale “strongly 
negative to “strongly positive.” 
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SCARED OR NAÏVE? AN EXPLORATORY STUDY ON USERS PERCEPTIONS OF ONLINE 
PRIVACY DISCLOSURES 
10 
Permission requests to access the user's location (PER4), read their calendar (PER9) or 
grant full Internet access (PER5) were rated as neutral. However permission about contacts 
(PER1), accessing or sending SMSs (PER3), modify stored files (PER6) or taking 
photographs (PER8) were considered extremely negative by the majority of the participants 
(see table 2 in appendix A for a description of all the permission requests). 
Figure 3 shows the willingness to pay for privacy. We can see that participants were 
willing to pay between £1.50 and £2.75 to protect their privacy, denying permissions to the 
app developer. Read SMS (AP6), track browser history (AP11)and take pictures with the 
camera (AP12) were the permissions that participants were most willing to pay to deny. Users 
are less willing to pay to deny permission requests related to their location (AP1-AP4) (see 
table 3 in Appendix A for a description of all the permission requests).  
 
 
Figure 2. Apps permissions’ rating 7 likert-scale 
 
Figure 3. Willingness to pay to denyapp’s 
permission requests - scenario 
 
The users’ perception of app permission requests as positive or negative is correlated with 
their willingness to pay. For example, participants rated as highly negative permission 
requests related to reading and editing SMS’s (PER3), and were willing to pay £2.75 to deny 
this permission to the app developer (AP6). We can also see this correlation in relation to 
reading contact data from the users address book - between PER1 and AP8.  On the other 
hand, participants considered permission requests related to location as negative, but not so 
negatively as those previously mentioned, and were willing to pay only around £1.50 to deny 
that permission.  
Users seem to be more reluctant in accepting permission requests that involve data from 
third parties (such as friends or contacts) than those only involving their own data, such as 
location and calendar (PER9). We can see that they perceive the calendar request neutrally in 
the rating, but are willing to pay to protect the calendar when it involves friends and co-
workers (AP10). 
4.4.3 Cookie Notices 
In the second survey, when asked if they thought that the use of cookie notifications in general 
is positive, negative, or a neutral, 63 percent of the participants answered that they were 
neutral towards it and only 9 percent indicated that they considered the practice to be negative. 
(see table 4 in appendix A for a description of all the cookie notices). 
0 2 4 6 
PER1 
PER2 
PER3 
PER4 
PER5 
PER6 
PER7 
PER8 
PER9 
PER10 
$0,00 
$0,50 
$1,00 
$1,50 
$2,00 
$2,50 
$3,00 
IADIS International Journal on WWW/Internet 
11 
 
Figure 4. Cookie notice rating 
Nevertheless, as seen in figure 4, we see significant variation in how different notices are 
rated. Cookie notices that inform the user that by continuing to use the site they are consenting 
to the use of cookies, without further explanation, as is the case of cookie notice (CN2 and 
CN7) are perceived as negative.  
5. DISCUSSION AND IMPLICATIONS FOR DESIGN 
The results presented in this work indicate that the different forms of privacy disclosure have 
different impacts on user understanding and hence on the meaningfulness of the consent that 
the users give. Our key findings are in four areas: Heterogeneity & Personal Context; Limited 
User Inference; Cost Justification and The Value of Consent.  
Heterogeneity & Personal Context:We observe significant heterogeneity between 
participants with regard to which content is considered positive, negative and neutral.  This 
seems to be partly the result of different beliefs about what the statements mean in practice, 
perceptions of the legitimacy of the processing that is disclosed and personal sensitivity to 
privacy concerns in general.   
The qualitative findings from the focus groups indicate that privacy attitudes are very 
diverse and depend on personal concerns and context. Users link the information that they're 
provided with to a diverse range of values and their own situation. This context includes 
physical location, culture and specific privacy concerns such as being part of a particular 
social group.  
Assisting users in relating data-handling practices to their own contextual concerns should 
be a goal for meaningful consent interactions,although it is unclear exactly what types of 
interaction might help with this. There is, perhaps, an education aspect in helping users to 
predict the likely impact of a given practice, but this should not absolve service providers 
themselves of their responsibility for fostering user understanding. 
Limited User Inference: Related to personal context, there seems to be a general inability 
among users to infer the possible uses or effects of a piece of technology, or to infer the 
impact on their own privacy from a particular practice or data collection purpose. For instance, 
many users are unable to infer that the use of cookies allows their web browsing history to be 
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tracked by third parties, and further are unable to infer that this tracking allows information 
about their demographics or interests to be inferred by those third parties. 
This raises the question of how explanations should be framed. At present, most of the 
cookie notices are framed in purely technical notions - “we use cookies” - and provide very 
little information about the actual uses to which those cookies will be put. For instance, none 
of the cookie notices we observed in the course of preparing the focus group materials 
explained that cookies would be used to target advertisements or draw inferences about the 
user, although this was clearly the case on many of the websites we visited. App permissions 
are also largely technical. They provide granular control over what data or features an app can 
access, but provide no information about what purpose that access will be put to. Privacy 
policies contain a mix of narratives, covering both purpose and technology. However, 
statements about technology are often hard to understand and are often accompanied by fairly 
general statements about purpose that make contextualisation difficult. 
Cost Justification:Despite frequent claims that users make cost-benefit judgments when 
using online services, and that the use of online services reveals a preference for services over 
privacy, we find little evidence of that through the focus groups. The lack of user 
understanding and inability to articulate the link between described practices and personal 
privacy concerns itself seems to preclude any meaningful cost estimation. However, we did 
observe that many participants engage in a form of “cost justification”, particularly with 
regard to app permissions.  
This conclusion, which implies that most users take a negative-by-default view of data 
collection or sharing seems to be supported by the finding that privacy policies that indicate 
that personal data is being collected or shared are considered negative by the majority of the 
participants, whereas those indicating that personal data is going to be protected and not 
shared are perceived positively.  
The Value of Consent:Many participants, in the case of app permission requests and cookie 
notices, feel that a notice with no real choice over the use of cookies or which permissions are 
allowed is in itself a negative thing.  This does not necessarily seem to be based on specific 
concerns but instead seems to reflect a preference for choice itself.  This is reflected in both 
the qualitative focus group data as well as the quantitative data from the cookie survey.  
Cookie notices 2, 4, 5 and 7 – the least positively rated notices – are framed as an ultimatum 
using language such as “we assume.” This is interesting, as it suggests that consent 
interactions that provide meaningful choice to users improve the user's perception of the 
relevant app or service, and complements the earlier research that shows improved trust as a 
result of more readable privacy policies (Ermakova et al. 2014).   
This finding suggests that users evaluate consent interactions with regard to instrumental 
as well as terminal values. That is to say that they care about the way in which choices and 
information about data processing are provided to them, as well as just the options that they 
have. The implication is that meaningful consent interactions may provide value to service 
providers beyond just legal compliance, acting as a means to improve user trust in a service. 
6. CONCLUSION 
The results and challenges presented here outline some of the challenges for designers and 
providers of online services that rely on consent from users.  They provide some guidance to 
IADIS International Journal on WWW/Internet 
13 
policy makers about the potential pitfalls of consent – such as framing explanations in 
technical terms that, while truthful, do not appear to support user understanding. 
As well as identifying some particular challenges that those interested in consent must 
overcome, we also find that consent in itself seems to be valued by users and that providing 
consent may have intrinsic value beyond merely legal compliance.We show that users 
typically view information disclosures negatively unless they are able to understand why a 
particular type of processing is taking place, and that they consider other aspects beyond this, 
such as whether they are being treated fairly and if the service provider or app developor is 
trustworthy. 
Future research could look at the relationship between trust on the website or app 
developer and evaluation of content of privacy polices and app permissions requests 
In future work, we intend to address each of the identified challenges as well as 
formalising the value of consent itself, and we hope that the challenges and opportunities 
identified here may also encourage other researchers to begin tackling the challenges, and 
realising the value, of consent. 
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APPENDIX A:  
TABLES OF DISCLOSURE STATEMENTS 
Table 1. Facebook and Google’s Privacy Policy statements 
PS1 We do not share personal information with companies, organizations and individuals outside 
of Google unless we have your consent. 
PS2 We may collect information about the services that you use and how you use them, like 
when you visit a website that uses our advertising services or you view and interact with our 
ads and content. This information includes: Device information; Log information; Location 
information; Unique application number; Local storage; Cookies and anonymous identifiers. 
PS3 We use technologies like cookies, pixels, and local storage (like on your browser or device, 
which is similar to a cookie but holds more information) to provide and understand a range 
of products and services. 
PS4 Cookies are small pieces of data that are stored on your computer, mobile phone or other 
device. Pixels are small blocks of code on webpages that do things like allow another server 
to measure viewing of a webpage and often are used in connection with cookies. 
PS5 For many ads we serve, advertisers may choose their audience by location, demographics, 
likes, keywords, and any other information we receive or infer about users. 
PS6 We process personal information on our servers in many countries around the world. We 
may process your personal information on a server located outside the country where you 
live. 
PS7 You may also set your browser to block all cookies, including cookies associated with our 
services, or to indicate when a cookie is being set by us. However, its important to remember 
that many of our services may not function properly if your cookies are disabled. For 
example, we may not remember your language preferences. 
PS8 We use Cookies, pixels and other similar technologies to: [Make our service easier or faster 
to use] 
PS9 We use Cookies, pixels and other similar technologies to: [Protect you, others and ourselves] 
PS10 Many of our services require you to sign up for an account. When you do, we ask for 
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personal information, like your name, email address, telephone number or credit card. 
PS11 We and our partners use various technologies to collect and store information when you visit 
a Google service, and this may include sending one or more cookies or anonymous 
identifiers to your device.  
PS12 People have different privacy concerns. Our goal is to be clear about what information we 
collect, so that you can make meaningful choices about how it is used. 
PS13 Your trust is important to us which is why we don't share information we receive about you 
with others unless we have: received your permission; given you notice, such as by telling 
you about it in this policy; or removed your name and any other personally identifying 
information from it. 
PS14 We share information we have about you within the family of companies that are part of 
Facebook.  
Table 2. App permission requests 
PER1 Your personal information: Read contact data, write contact data 
PER2 Services that cost you money: Directly call phone numbers send SMS messages 
PER3 Your messages: edit SMS or MMS, read SMS or MMS, receive MMS, receive SMS 
PER4 Your location: fine (GPS) location 
PER5 Network communication: full Internet access 
PER6 Storage: modify/delete SD card contents 
PER7 Phone calls: read phone state and identity 
PER8 Hardware controls: take pictures and videos 
PER9 Read your calendar 
PER10 Read your browser's history and bookmarks 
Table 3. App permissions requests – willingness to pay in app scenario 
App P1 Access coarse location sources such as the cellular network database to determine your 
approximate location.  
App P2 Access fine location sources such as the GPS.  
App P3 Access extra location commands to interfere with the operation of the GPS or other 
location sources.  
App P4 Access your precise location using GPS or network location sources such as cell towers 
and Wi-Fi.  
App P5 Receive and process your new SMS texts.  
App P6 Read all your SMS texts stored on the phone.  
App P7 Read your phone number and serial number.  
App P8 Read all your contact (address) data.  
App P9 Read a list of all your accounts.  
App P10 Read all your calendar events including those of friends and coworkers.  
App P11 Read all URLs you visited and all the browser bookmarks.  
App P12 Take pictures and video with the camera at any time.  
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Table 4. Cookie notices (text equivalent) 
CN1 GOV.UK uses cookies to make the site simpler. Find out more about cookies. 
CN2 We would like to place cookies on your computer to help us make this website better. By 
continuing to browse this site you are consenting to this. 
CN3 By accessing, continuing to use, or navigating throughout this site you accept that we will 
utilise certain browser cookies to improve the experience, which you receive with us. 
William Hill do not use any cookies which interfere with your privacy, but only ones which 
will improve your experience whilst using our site, please refer to our FAQs for further 
information on our use of cookies and how you prevent their use should you wish. 
CN4 ASOS uses cookies to ensure that we give you the best experience on our website. If you 
continue we assume that you consent to receive all cookies on all ASOS websites. 
CN5 We use cookies to ensure we give you the best experience on our website. If you continue, 
we'll assume that you are happy to receive all cookies on the Transport for London website. 
CN6 Santander uses cookies to deliver superior functionality and to enhance your experience of 
our websites. Read about how we use cookies and how you can control theme here. 
Continued use of this site indicates that you accept this policy. 
CN7 By using this site you agree to the use of cookies for analytics, personalised content and ads. 
 
